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Contextual Unanimity and the Units 
of Selection Problem· 
Stuart Glennantt 
Department of Philosophy and Religion 
Butler University 
Sober and Lewontin's critique of genie selectionism is based upon the principle that a 
unit of selection should make a context-independent contribution to fitness. Critics have 
effectively shown that this principle is Oawed. In this paper I show that the context 
independence principle is an instance of a more general principle for characterizing 
causes.called the contextual unanimity principle. I argue that this latler principle, while 
widely accepted, is erroneous. Wha t is needed is to replace the approach to causality 
characterized by the contextual unanimity criterion with an approach based on the 
concept of causal mechanism. After sketching such an approach, I show how it can be 
used to shed light on the units of selection problem. 
1. Introduction. Elliot Sober and Richard Lewontin's well-known argu-
ment against genie selection is based upon the claim that genie selection 
misrepresents the causes of evolution: 
Although models of evolutionary processes conforming to [Richard 
Dawkins' and George. C. Williams'] view of genie selection may per-
mit computation, they often misrepresent the causes of evolution. The 
reason is that genie selection coefficients are artifacts, not causes of 
evolution. (Sober and Lewontin 1982, 108) 
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But how does one distinguish causes from artifacts? The principle that 
Sober and Lewontin use is that causes should make a context-independent 
contribution to bringing about their efTects. The level of selection is the 
level at which the causes operate, and this level can be recognized by a 
context independence principle: 
(1) If the fitness of X is context-sensitive, then there is not selection for 
X; rather there is selection at a level of organization higher than X. 
(Sober and Lewontin l982, 579) 
Sober and Lewontin's critics, notably Sterelny and Kitcher ( 1988) and 
Waters ( 1991), defend genie selectionism by criticizing this principle. But 
while the critics do demonstrate flaws in principle (l), they do not thereby 
save genie selectionism. 
Principle (I) is in fact an application of a general principle about cau-
sation which John Dupre has called the contextual unanimity principle. 
This principle is (roughly) that a cause should always increase the prob-
ability of its effect. I shall argue that this principle, while widely accepted, 
is false. and that it is because it is false that Sober and Lewontin's critique 
of genie selectionism fails. To substantiate Sober and Lewontin's clain1 
that genie selection coefficients are artifacts rather than causes, what is 
needed is an alternative approach to causation that does not presuppose 
contextual unanimity. The main goal of this paper will be to argue that 
this need can be filled by an approach to causation based upon mecha-
nisms (cf. Glennan 1996). 
Section 2 of this paper recapitu lates the argument between Sober and 
Lewontin and their critics, showing how their dispute centers around the 
contextual unanimity principle. In Section 3 I discuss the contextual una-
nimity principle more generally, showing both what is wrong with it and 
why, given bow obviously false it is, philosophers have continued to es-
pouse it. In Section 4, I describe some important aspects of the mechanistic 
approach to causation. Finally, in Section 5, I return to the units of selec-
tion problem, showing how a mechanistic approach allows one to make 
the case for higher-level selection in a way that is immune to the criticisms 
of the contextual unanimity principle. 
Prior to beginning my discussion of the units of selection controversy, 
I should clarify which units of selection problem I will address. There are 
at least two. One problem concerns the nature and efficacy of group se-
lection or selection for entities at a sub-organismic level of organization, 
as opposed to selection acting on individual organisms. Brandon ( 1982) 
calls this problem the ' level of selection problem'. It is centrally concerned 
with bow one draws the boundary between differentially selected entities 
and thei r environments. Brandon reserves the term 'uni t of selection prob-
lem' for the question of whether all selection can be understood in terms 
120 STUART GLENNAN 
of differential fitness of individual alleles, or whether fitnesses should be 
attributed to larger segments of the genome. To use David Hull's termi-
nology, the first question concerns interactors. while the second question 
concerns replicators. Although their 1982 paper does not mention this 
distinction, Sober and Lewontin' s argument clearly concerns the units of 
selection problem rather than the levels of selection problem. ln the con-
text of this debate, all parties acknowledge that selection for genotypes 
occurs indirectly via selection for phenotypes. The question at issue con-
cerns bow large or small a segment of the genome can be selected for in 
this manner. 
Waters' critique of Sober and Lewontin makes it clear that Sober and 
Lewontin's position assumes an answer to the levels of selection prob-
lem- that is, for a given case it is not purely conventional how one draws 
the boundary beLween a selected entity (the interactor) and its environ-
ment. ln particular, Sober and Lewontin assume for the case they discuss 
(sickle cell anemia) that the level of selection is that of the organism and 
argue on that basis that genes do not make context-independent contri-
butions to an organism's fitness. 
Waters argues that the decision about where to draw the boundary 
between the selective domain and the environment is essentially pragmatic 
and conventional, and it is on that basis that he argues against Sober and 
Lewontin's position. My concern wil l be to show that even ({Sober and 
Lewontin are right that this boundary is non-conventional, they still can't 
use contextual unanimity to individuate a unit of selection relative to this 
boundary. In the last section of this paper I shall defend Sober and Le-
wontin 's principle about the non-conventionality of the boundary between 
selective domain and environment. Ultimately any argument against the 
universal applicability of genie selection models requires a successful de-
fense of this principle. But even those who do not find my defense of this 
principle persuasive will perhaps grant that the mechanistic approach to 
causation shows how one can, relative to a choice of environmental 
boundary, identify the unit of selection. 
2. The Contextual Unanimity Approach to the Units of Selection. Sober and 
Lewontin's critique of genie selection is based upon what Ernst Mayr has 
called the principle of genetic relativity- that is, the principle Lhal the 
contribution of a gene to an organism's fitness depends upon the organ-
ism's other genes. Phenomena such as dominance, heterozygote superi-
ority. and epistasis all iUustrate thjs principle. The principle of genetic 
relativity implies that genie fitnesses are context dependent, and hence, by 
principle ( I ), that there cannot be selection at the genie level. The specific 
example Sober and Lewontin use to demonstrate their claim is the phe-
nomenon of heterozygote superiority that occurs at the locus implicated 
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in sickle cell anemia. To recount briefly the standard textbook account, 
sickle cell anemia, which is a disease that virtually eliminates the possibility 
of producing offspring, is caused by being homozygous for a single mutant 
allele a. While it is clearly deleterious to be homozygous for the sickle cell 
allele, possession of a single sickle cell allele has benefits for the organism. 
The beterozygote suffers few effects of anemia and gains increased resis-
tance to the malaria parasite. Thus, at least in environments in which 
malaria is a threat to survival and reproduction. the heterozygote Aa is 
superior to homozygotes for either the sick le cell (aa) or wild-type allele 
(AA). Sober and Lewontin concl ude that one cannot say, in isolation, that 
possessing the sickle cell allele either enhances or diminishes fitness, so 
selection cannot occur for (or against) the individual allele. Allelic selec-
tion coefficients for a population can be obtained by averaging over the 
coefficients for the genotypes (AA, Aa. cw), but it is only the genotypic 
coefficients that represent the forces of selection. 
The idea that context sensitivity of effect can be used as a criterion to 
rule out an entity as a unit of selection is not original to Sober and Le-
wontin ( 1982). The principle was explicitly introduced lo the philosophical 
literature by Wimsatt ( 1980, 198 1 ). who in turn was inspired by earlier 
work of Mayr ( 1963) and Lewontin ( 1974). The novel contribution of 
Sober and Lewontin's paper was to propose that the context sensitivity 
criterion was in fact a criterion for distinguishing causes from artifacts. 
The difficulty with the context sensitivity criterion that has been raised 
both by Sterelny and Kitcher and by Waters is that even the fitnesses of 
the larger segments of the genome, in this case the allele pairs occurring 
at a locus, have only a context-sensitive effect on fitness. The fitness of 
any genotype varies with environment. In the sickle cell case, for instance, 
the beterozygote is only more fit than the wild-type homozygote in envi-
ronments where malaria is a threat. 
Sober and Lewootin of course recognize that the fitness of a genotype 
varies with environment, and their response to this point would be to say 
that a different set of selective forces will be acting on populations where 
malaria is a threa t than on populations where it is not. The differing se-
lection processes will produce the differing evolutionary trajectories of 
these isola ted populations. However, as Sterelny and Kitcher argue, thjs 
kind of variation in fitness may affect organisms that we would consider 
to be in the same population. For instance, though an increase in melanic 
coloration of moths in England has been an adaptive response to envi-
ronmental changes caused by industrialization. it certainly must be the 
case that some melanic moths will spend time in parts of their environment 
where melanic colora tion actually will increase their visibil ity to preda-
tors.1 As these moths are not geographically isolated from moths that 
I. Recent critics of Keulewell's experiments (cf. Majerus 1998) have raised serious 
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happen to spend more time on trees in which melanic coloration provides 
protection (and as the two sets of moths may interbreed) it seems prob-
lematic to treat those moths as part of a different selection process. 
Another way to try to defend Sober and Lewontin is to construe the 
context independence principle as being relativized to a fixed environment. 
Of course, the fitness of a genotype depends upon the environment of 
organisms possessing that genotype, but {the argument goes) the fitness 
of individual genes will depend upon more than the environment. For 
instance. the fitness value of a sickle cell allele will depend not only upon 
the environmental risk of malaria, but, most importantly, on the other 
allele that is found at that locus. But, as both Waters, and Sterelny and 
Kitcher, point out, the genie selectionist will characterize the genetic con-
text as part of the allele's environment. Once Sober and Lewontin grant 
(as they must) that the fitness of an entity varies with its environment, 
then they must offer some principled reason to draw the boundary between 
the selected entities and their environment at the boundary of the organ-
ism. Sterelny and Kitcher and Waters, however, see no such reason, and 
conclude from this that there is no privileged unit of selection. 
I shall argue in Section 5 of this paper for the claim that in the sickle 
cell case there are principled reasons to draw the selected en-
tity/environment boundary at the level of the organism. But even if my 
claim is correct, it will not immunize Sober and Lewontin's position from 
concerns about context sensitivity. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
a segment of the genome is a unit of selection so long as, relative to a 
specific ecological environment, that segment makes a context-indepen-
dent contribution to an organism's fitness. Even if we grant this, we cannot 
say that the diploid genotype is the unit of selection in the sickle cell case. 
Sober and Lewontin argue as if the fitness of the alleles A and a depend 
upon genetic context, while the fitness of the genotypes AA. aa, and Aa 
do not depend upon genetic context. But this is clearly not the case, for 
the fitness of the organism will depend (non-additively) upon genes at 
other loci. To take the most obvious example, if an organism carries a 
lethal allele at another locus, the alleles at the sickle cell locus will not 
affect the organism's fitness in any way. Mayr's principle of genetic rela-
tivity does not stop at the individual locus. The consequence of this is that, 
if one requires context independence for an entity to be a unit of selection, 
the unit of selection will inevitably be the entire genome. 
doubts about the standard explanation of the selective value of melanism in the pepper 
moth (according to which melanic moths were selected for because industria.Jization 
darkened lree bark and destroyed lichens on trees whose coloration provided camou-
flage for the wild type). However. these doubts do not undermine Sterelny and Kitcher's 
conceptual point. 
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Thjs is an unwelcome conclusion to anyone who thinks the units of 
selection question is a substantive one. Such a person would prefer a less 
degenerative conclusion in which selection operates simultaneously on 
units of different sizes. In some cases an allele at a single locus might be 
a unit of selection; in cases of dominance or heterosis, selection must be 
seen as operating on the pair of alleles at a locus; in cases of epistasis, the 
unit of selection would be a part of the genome consisting of multiple loci. 
Such a position can, I think. be susta ined, but only if one gives up the 
requirement of context independence. 
3. Contextual Unanimity as a Causal Concept. The context independence 
principle used by Sober and Lewontin is, as I suggested at the outset, an 
application to selection theory of a general principle about causation that 
Dupre ( 1984) has dubbed the contextual unanimity principle. Versions of 
this principle have been endorsed al times by Cartwright, Otte, Sober, 
EeUs, and Humphreys. Dupre and Cartwright (1988) offer the following 
version, which they call "CL" for ·'causal law" 
CL Ps probabilistically cause Qs if in every population homogeneous with 
respect to all other causally relevant factors, the presence of Ps raises 
the probability of the occurrence of Qs. 
The variables P and Q are intended to be general terms of some kind-
properties, event types or state types. For instance, if P and Q were the 
properties of smoking and having cancer, CL would provide a specifica-
tion of the conditions under which smoking can be said to cause cancer. 
Broadly speaking, the point of CL is to distinguish correlation from ca u-
sation. To say that smoking causes cancer is to say more than that smoking 
raises the probability of cancer. In particular, the import of Simpson's 
paradox is that there are situations in which a positive correlation between 
two factors in a population can be reversed when that population is par-
titioned by a causally relevant variable.2 By stipulating that the cause must 
raise the probability of its effect in a ll possible partitions of causally rele-
vant variables, the possibility of mistaking a causal for a non-causal cor-
relation is avoided. 
There are a variety of technical difficulties that can be raised with vari-
ous versions of the contextual unanimity principle (Ray 1992, Glcnnan 
1997), but the most import.ant is this: There will be few if any candidates 
2. The classic example of this concerns a prima facie case of sex discrimination in 
admissions at Berkeley's graduate school. The overaU admission rate for women was 
significantly less than that for men. but when admissions data were partitioned by 
department , it was discovered that women applied disproportionately LO departments 
with lower admissions rates, and tha t department by department, the admission rate 
for women was comparable to that of men. See Can wright ( 1979). 
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for P and Qin which the contextual unanimity condition can be met. Thus, 
if CL provides the correct analysis of causal generaljzations of the form 
'Ps cause Qs', almost all causal generalizations will be false. Jt will be faJse 
that smoking probabilistically causes cancer; it will be false that obesity 
probabilistically causes heart problems; it will be false that drug use by 
parents probabilisticaJly causes drug use in their children. The reason such 
generalizations will be false is that an event of type P will only raise the 
probability of an event of type Q in the presence of suitable background 
conditions and in the absence of confounding factors. For instance, a 
condemned criminal who smokes his first cigarette moments before his 
execution will not raise his probability of getting cancer. Indeed, smoking 
might even decrease one's risk of cancer in unusual circumstances. Sup-
pose an avid smoker heads out to buy cigarettes and suppose that while 
he is gone, an environmental accident occurs causing the release of pow-
erful carcinogens near hls home. If the carcinogenic effects of the accident 
outweigh those of the cigarettes, smoking would actually have been a 
counteracting cause of cancer. 
Now it is possible to accept tbjs consequence of contextual unanimity-
to say that generalizations like the one that smoking causes cancer are 
false. Humphreys (1989) adopts just this view. But to adopt this approach 
would require a complete revision of our ordinary practices of making 
causal generalizations. Ordinarily, we would allow, for instance, that we 
have ample evidence that smoking causes cancer, even though it is not the 
case that every smoker bas ms/her probability of contracting cancer raised 
by smoking. Alternatively, we can reject contextual unanimity outright, 
as is suggested by Dupre (1984, 1993) and Dupre and Cartwright (1988). 
They argue that we ought to treat generalizations as representing "causal 
upshots," which is to say that we should treat them as saying that, in a 
particular population, Ps have on average increased the probability of Qs. 
While I find this the only plausible way to understand such claims, this 
interpretation implies that such claims are not really type-level claims at 
all, but are rather singular claims about particular populations.3 
Contextual unanimity principles are meant to provide a definition (or 
at least a test condition) for causal laws, where causal laws are understood 
as relations between properties, or event types. I have showed that con-
textual unanjmity is a very hard condition to meet. In light of this discus-
sion, it should be clear that the objections raised to Sober and Lewontin's 
3. Notice that there is a prirna facie inconsistency between Cartwright's endorsement 
of contextual unanimity conditions in her 1979 and 1989 and her rejection of them in 
Dupre and Cartwright 1988. She attempts to resolve this inconsistency by suggesting 
that contextual unanimity applies only to what she calls .. capacity claims" and not Lo 
what she calls "causal laws." See my 1997 fo r an argument that her strategy fails. 
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proposal by Waters, Sterelny, and Kitcher a ll amount to pointing out 
fai lures of contextual unanimity. Their examples of frequency-dependent 
causation, the differing microenvironments of melanic moths, etc., are a ll 
meant to show that there exist sets of causally relevant background con-
ditions which reverse the supposedly positive effect of an allele, a diploid 
genotype, or any other larger segment of the genome. It is just wrong, 
applying the contextual unanimity principle, to say that having a partic-
ular genotype causes an increase in fitness. 
While I beljeve that Waters, Sterelny, and J(jtcher have indeed suc-
ceeded in showing that contextual unanimity, and wi th it, principle (1), is 
never met, I do not think this criticism undermines the larger point of 
Sober and Lewontin's position-which is that some fitness values (like 
those of single alleles in the sickle cell case) represent artifacts, while others 
(like those of the diploid genotypes) represent causes. The problem with 
Sober and Lewontin's approach is that they try to distinguish causes from 
artifacts by means of type-level claims generated by CL (or similar prin-
ciples), but no such type-level claims are available. However, when one 
claims, for instance, that a diploid genotype fitness represents a cause while 
an allele fitness represents an artifact, one is really making a remark about 
the causes of evolution in a particular evolutionary process- that is, one 
is making a token-level (or singular) causal claim. Even if one accepts a 
principle like CL as being the correct sort of principle for marking type-
level causal claims, it is simply inapplicable to the problem of determining 
the correctness of singular causal claims. 
Many philosophers will doubt my suggestion that the causal claims 
made in evolutionary biology are singular claims, for at first glance this 
position seems at variance with the population-oriented and statistical 
character of evolutionary theory. Fitnesses it is said should be attributed 
to genotypes, not to genotokens. Evolutionary theory, as Sterelny and 
Kitcher so elegantly put it, abstracts from " the thousand natural shocks 
that organisms and natural populations are heir to" to divine the "central 
tendencies" (Sterelny and Kitcher 1988, 593). True enough- but central 
tendency claims are still singular claims. They are claims about the average 
contribution of some property to an outcome in a particular population. 
ln short, they are a species of causal upshot claim in the sense of Dupre 
and Cartwright. A population may consist of hundreds, thousands, or 
millions of organisms, but this population is itself a complex individual of 
which these organisms are its many parts. Change the population, and the 
average contributions will change.q 
4. A referee suggests that, even if in reality populations are complex individuals with 
non-uniform parts, treating them as classes is often a useful modeling technique. I would 
agree that such techniques are useful. but this is not the same as providing a realistic 
account of the actual causal processes involved. 
126 STUART GLENNAN 
But, if the causal claims of evolutionary theory are singular, then we 
must look to another principle besides contextual unanimity to distinguish 
causes from art ifacts. For this, we need a theory elaborating the truth 
conditions for singular causal claims. The best known theory is that of 
David Lewis ( 1973). Lewis' theory grounds the truth of causal claims in 
the truth of certain counterfactual conditionals. Although there are clearly 
things to recommend this theory, there are serious difficulties with using 
it to determine the truth of particular claims in evolutionary theory. The 
truth conditions for counterfactuals stipulated by Lewis (which have to 
do with the truth of material conditionals in similar possible worlds) are 
not presented in a way that makes clear what empirical tests should be 
applied to test particular counterfactual claims. I have elsewhere devel-
oped an alternative approach to singular causation according to which an 
event is connected to another event if those events are appropriately con-
nected by an intervening mechanism (Glennan 1996). The theory that I 
have developed does not ultimately eliminate the dependency of singular 
causal claims on the truth of counterfactuals, for the definition of a mech-
anism I offer itself appeals to counterfactuaJ principles. However, as a 
practical matter, this theory has the great advantage that it offers an ep-
istemic principle for discerning the truth of causal claims which is conso-
nant with the practices of science: The best way to establish that a certain 
event was a cause of another event is to show that there exists a mechanism 
connecting the first event to the second. 
In brief. the position I shall defend is this: Sober and Lewontin's cri-
tique of genie selectionism, and with it their claim that genie fitnesses 
typicaJly represent artifacts rather than causes of evolution, can be sus-
tained by showing that the mechanisms responsible for enhancing the fit-
ness of individual organisms generally depend upon larger segments of the 
genome than the single allele. 
4. The Idea of Mechanism. Before considering a mechanistic approach to 
the units of selection controversy, it is well to consider the nature of mech-
anisms in general.5 In earlier work (Glennan 1996) I have argued for an 
analysis of mechanisms according to which a mechanism is a complex 
system whose parts interact to produce a behavior. I use the tenn ' behav-
ior' loosely to refer to "what the mechanism does," that is, to the set of 
dispositions which lhe system has in virtue of the arrangement of and 
5. There has been a spate of recent wo rk on the concept of mechanism, including 
Machamer. Darden, and Craver 2000, Thagard 1999. and a symposium at lhe 2000 
PSA meetings. While there are some important variations in these accounts, I believe 
that the basic view of the nature of mechanisms is similar to the one I propose in 
Glconan 1996. 
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connections between its parts. It is crucial to notice that mechanisms, as 
we describe them, always do or are for something- the behavior. A de-
scription of the behavior of a mechanism consti tutes the explanans, while 
a description of the parts of the mechanism and their interaclions consti-
tutes the explanandum.6 
Products of human engineering provide excellent examples of mecha-
nisms. Let us consider an example whose principles are well understood 
by most everyone-the modern toilet. A toilet can be analyzed as a mech-
anism for removing water and waste from the bowl and replacing it with 
fresh water. To characterize this mechanism (or as we might say, construct 
a model of it) we begin by giving a description of the mechanism's behav-
ior. This behavior is actually dispositional, for what a toilet bowl docs is 
to replace the water and waste within the bowl with fresh water. {/' the 
toilet's lever is depressed. We complete the model by describing the various 
parts of the mechanism and the way in which these parts interact to pro-
duce the mechanism's behavior. In this case the parts of the mechanism 
include the bowl, the lever, the tank, the flapper valve connecting the tank 
to the bowl, the chain connecting the lever to the fl oat valve, the intake 
valve, and the float. The mechanism works about like this: Depressing the 
lever pulls the chain , which in turn momentarily opens the flapper valve. 
When the flapper valve opens, the water in the tank rushes into the bowl, 
forcing the waste and water then in the bowl down the drain and replacing 
it wi th the fresh tank water. At the same time, the drop in water level in 
the tank causes the float to fall , opening the intake valve and causing the 
tank to refill- a process which continues until the water level raises the 
floa t, closing the valve and returning the toilet to its original state.7 
I have del iberately chosen a simple system- an artifact of human en-
gineering in which both the behavior of the artifact and the mechan ism 
that produces this behavior are well understood . It should be evident, 
however, that not all mechanisms are artifacts. ln the first place, many 
interesting mechanisms (especially biological ones) are products of selec-
6. The analysis of mechanisms I propose resembles m many respects what Cummins 
(1975) calls functional analysis. and the mode of explanation" hat Ka ufmann ( 1970) 
ca lls "articulation of parts explanation ... It is tempting 10 use 'function· in place of the 
term ' behavio r'. I avoid this because ( I) the function of an entity is often construed a~ 
its role within a larger system. and (2) it is also sometimes assumed that enti1ics ca n 
have functions only if they have this function as a result of design. For more on the 
explanatory role of mechanisms. see Craver 2001 and G lennan forthcoming. 
7. Some might object that this rough description of how a toilet works hardlyconslilutes 
a model: however. o ne could construct a model of a sort more familia r in the li1era1ure. 
by identifying a set of sta te variables to characterize the sta le of the vario us pans of 
the mecha nism together with laws o f succession 10 represent the various interac1ions 
between these parts. But 10 do this would be silly. 
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lion processes and are not the product of intelligent designers. Moreover, 
there are in fact many systems, e.g., our solar system, that are mechanisms 
in the sense of the definition above, even tho ugh they a re not products of 
design processes of any kind. 
Mechanisms in the sense I have described them here are 1hi11gs- that 
is, systems that are collections of parts. The term 'mechanism' is also, 
however, used in another, related sense. Consider, for instance the folJow-
ing question : What is the mechanism (or what are the mechanisms) which 
led to the outbreak of the First World War? The purport of this question 
is not to ask for a description of a thing, but rather a description of a 
causal process- the process that led to the outbreak of the F irst World 
War. We need to consider briefly the relation between these two concepts 
of mechanism, for it has implications for the distinction between singular 
and general causal claims that underlies my criticism of contextual una-
nimity. 
A causal process is generally understood as a singular sequence of 
events, or, as it is sometimes called, a causal chain.8 When we ask about 
the causal process leading up to the First World War, we a re inquiring as 
to what seq uence of events led to the war. lt is in virtue of the existence 
of such sequences- the causal nexus- that a particular event (like the as-
sassination of Archduke Ferdinand) can be said to cause another partic-
ular event. Il would be an abuse of usage to treat the "First World War 
starting mechanism" as a system, or a thing. The reason arises from the 
very singularity of the event seq uence. Of course there were many things 
(complex systems) whose activities and interactions comprise the sequence 
of events leading to the start of World War I, but these things are not 
appropria tely thought of as themselves forming a single larger system. The 
reason is that the particular sequence of events that led World War I to 
occur when and how it did is unique. It depended upon a variety of par-
ticular factors, like the travel plans of the Archduke and the particular 
political events occurring in Serbia, Austria, and elsewhere in June and 
July of 1914. There is just one instance of the event type "beginning of 
World War I." 
The case is rather different with toilets. The event of my depressing the 
lever on my toilet reliably flushes my toilet. It has done so many times in 
the past, and will do so many times in the future. Moreover, there are 
millions of toi lets of essentially the same type which display the same 
reliable behavior. 
8. The causal chain will not in general be single stranded. lt may involve a network of 
interlocking events of arbiLrary complcidty. Note that some philosophers of science 
have taken path diagrams to represent causal chains. but these path diagrams generally 
represent type-level rather than singular causal associations. 
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The mechanistic viewpoint leads to a clearer understanding of the re-
lation between type and token causal claims. Mechanisms like toilets re-
liably produce certain kinds of event sequences. A causal claim about an 
instance of this event sequence-for instance. that my depressing the lever 
on the toilet on 12 noon, January I, 2000 caused the toilet to flush- is a 
singular causal claim. lt is true because there exists a mechanism (sensu 
process) leading from the lever-depressing event to the flushing event. 
There is also a mechanism, sensu system, which produces this event. We 
call it a system because it is stable, and it is so arranged that it is causally 
responsible for many sequences of this type. It is the existence of such 
stable systems that permits us in these cases to make causal generaliza-
tions. I can say generally that depressing the handle of my toilet causes it 
to flush, because there are many singular causal processes of this type 
created by the stable arrangement of parts in my toilet. I can say, yet more 
generally, that depressing toilet handles causes toilet Aushings, because 
there exist many toi let mechanisms of similar design whose stable config-
urations induce appropriate singular causal sequences. Note that while 
these causal generalizations about toilets are (I take it) true, there is not 
a contextually unanimous relation between lever depressing and flushing. 
Toilets can break in certain ways-the drain can become clogged, the 
chain connecting lever to flapper valve can become detached, etc.- and 
when they do break the connection between lever depressing and flushing 
breaks down. These constitute causally relevant background contexts in 
which lever depressings don' t increase the probability of toilet flushings. 
As a more scientifically interesting example. consider the claim that 
smoking causes lung cancer.9 As we saw, the contextual unanimity ap-
proach fails to work because there are instances in which smoking does 
not raise, or perhaps even lowers, the probability of cancer. On the mecha-
nistic analysis, we begin wi th the examination of singular claims, looking 
at the mechanism whereby ingestion of cigarette smoke leads to the growth 
of tumors. Carcinogens operate by mutating genes in the cell nucleus into 
oncogenes, genetic variants of normal genes that in various ways stimulate 
cell growth . However, there are two reasons that exposure to carcinogens 
does not invariably lead to cancer. In the first place. carcinogens do not 
invariably produce mutations. In the second place, even if a mutation 
occurs to produce an oncogene. cells generally have other genes that sup-
press tumor growth. Thus, it is only in the case where mutations occur 
both to an oncogene and possible suppressor genes that a cancer begins 
to grow. It is only by knowing in detail the mechanism by which carcin-
ogens change the structure of cellular DNA and by which these changes 
9. This discussion is abbreviated from Thagard"s discussion of cancer mechanisms 
(1999, 31 34). 
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accelerate cell growth that we can establish beyond doubt that in a par-
ticular instance the carcinogens in tobacco smoke caused cancer. 10 
Only after the mechanism of carcinogenesis has been established in 
particular cases is there a basis for making the causal generalization that 
smoking causes lung cancer. The crucial step is to recognize that within 
the population about which the generalization is made (namely human 
beings), Jung cells have very similar structures, and that these structures 
reliably tend to produce cancers. 
While it is necessary to establish singular causal connections before 
making generalizations, the criteria involved in making causal generali-
zations are in part epistemic and pragmatic. For a causal generalization 
to be true there must be a reliable mechanism, but there are no non-
pragmatic criteria for deciding how reliable is reliable enough. Similarly, 
we generalize by segregating individuals into classes and generalizing over 
those classes, but there are various ways to create these classes and our 
choices are certainly influenced by pragmatic concerns. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full account of the prag-
matics of causal generalizations. For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
point out that, whatever the details of this account, singular causal claims 
are conceptually prior to causal generalizations. Causal generalizations 
are true because there exist multiple instances of reliable mechanisms 
(sensu systems) of certain types. Reliable but not unbreakable mechanisms 
give rise to causal generalizations that are robust but not contextually 
unanimous. 
The distinction between mechanisms as systems and mechanisms as 
processes is connected to anotber distinction that may be implicit in Ster-
elny and Kitcher's description of evolutionary theory as being concerned 
with "central tendencies," and is explicit in Sterelny ( 1996); this is the 
distinction between what Sterelny calls robust-process and actual-
sequence explanations. An actual-sequence explanation ''identifies the 
particular possible world that we inhabit" while the robust-process expla-
nation "compares our world to others" (Sterelny 1996, 195). An actual-
sequence explanation identifies the detailed sequence of events tbat leads 
to some other event in the actual world , while a robust-process explanation 
identifies events which are invariant across many nearby possible worlds. 
In this parlance, it would appear that the explanation of World War l in 
terms of the assassination of the Archduke is an actual-sequence expla-
10. 1 am not suggesting that epidemiological studies showing high correlations between 
smoJcjng and cancer do not give good reason to believe that smoking causes cancer. I 
am merely suggesting that the causal claim is ultimately a claim thal there exists a 
mechanism linking smoke to carcinogenesis and that epidemiological s tudies provide 
at best indirect evidence of this claim. 
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nation, since the particular sequence of events leading up to and following 
upon the assassination seem highly contingent. It was by no means inev-
itable (i.e., true in all nearby possible worlds) that the Archduke was going 
to be assassinated and that this assassination would lead to the outbreak 
of global war. On the other hand, the explanation of toilet flushing is a 
robust-process explanation. 11 
Sterelny's main point in his 1996 is that the same biological event is 
susceptible to two different kinds of explanations. It is also clear, in light 
both of this discussion and of Sterelny and Kitcher's (1988) claim that 
evolutionary theory is concerned with the "central tendencies" of the evo-
lutionary process, that Sterelny believes that evolutionary explanations are 
robust-process explanations. I am in agreement with both of these claims, 
but I believe that where Sterelny falls short is in characterizing the con-
ditions that give rise to robust processes. Like Lewis' approach to the truth 
conditions for counterfactuaJs, Sterelny seeks to characterize robust pro-
cesses in terms of actual sequences in similar possible worlds. But the 
concept of a similar possible world is fraught with epistemic problems, 
and at any rate, is not a concept that a biologist would appeal to in ex-
plaining the robust character of certain evolutionary processes. Much 
more congenial is the concept of a mechanism (sensu system), since mech-
anism is a concept frequently appealed to by biologists and reliable mech-
anisms give rise to robust processes. And, while I agree with Sterelny and 
Kitcher that evolutionary explanations should be concerned primarily 
with robust processes, when we look for the mechanisms that underlie 
these processes we shall find reasons to support Sober and Lewontin's 
suspicions of genie selectionism. 
5. Applying the Mechanistic Approach to the Units of Selection Problem. 
Sober and Lewontin's attack on genie selectionism is actually two tracked. 
First, they claim that genie selection coefficients are artifactual, because 
single genes don't make contextually unanimous contributions to viability 
and fitness. Second, they claim that they are artifactual because they ignore 
"the biological facts. " Since the first of these attacks has failed, I propose 
to concentrate on the second. The biological facts to which Sober and 
Lewontin allude are, in fact, facts about the mechanisms responsible for 
the production of phenotypic traits that differentially affect viability and 
fitness. 
Let us consider such a strategy as it applies to the sickle cell case. The 
11. lntereslingly, both Sterelny and I use the assassination of the Archduke as an ex-
ample of an actual-sequence explana tion. though I had written this passage before 
coming upon Sterelny's example. Whether this choice of examples is lbe product of 
some unseen robust process or a case of pure chance 1 can only speculate. 
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distribution of alleles A (wild type) and a (sickJe cell) is a product of se-
lection. The question is, is selection occurring for each allele (A or a), or 
for allele combinations (AA. Aa, and cia)'? The mechanistic approach sug-
gests the latter alternative, because developmental mechanisms produce 
three different phenotypic traits- namely, three different types of red 
blood cells-depending upon which of these three combinations appears 
in the genetic material of the individual organism. The AA genotype leads 
to the production of red blood cells containing only hemoglobin A. 12 These 
cells are the most efficient of the three at oxygen transport, as well as the 
most flexible and least fragile (i.e., least prone to hemolysis). The aa ge-
notype leads to the production of red blood cells containing hemoglobin 
S in place of hemoglobin A. The a ltered conformation of the protein di-
minishes the capacity of red blood cells to carry oxygen and increases 
rigidity and fragility of cells. This increased rigidity and fragility leads to 
sickling, which leads to blocking of capillaries and hemolysis (release of 
hemoglobin into plasma). These cellular traits lead to anemia with con-
sequences for growth, resistance to infection, and ultimately the proba-
bility that a person survives and reproduces. ln the heterozygote, both the 
wild-type allele and the sickle cell a llele are used by red blood cells to 
produce hemoglobin, leading to the presence of both normal and S he-
moglobin. Red blood cells of this kind are intermediate in terms of oxygen-
carrying capacity, rigidity, and fragility. However, because red blood cells 
are '"over-engineered,'' in most circumstances sickling does not occur, and 
red blood cells are able to deliver adequate supplies of oxygen to other 
systems in the body. Bearers of the sickle cell trait have somewhat reduced 
life expectancy, but tbe trait does not seem to have a significant negative 
impact on ei ther viability or fecundity. On the other hand, as noted above, 
the red blood cells containing some hemoglobin Sare resistant to infection 
by the malarial parasite, with a consequent increase in the viability and 
fecundity. 
J have told the story of how the sickle cell allele affects fitness in some-
what more detail than is usual, because it is precisely these "biological 
facts"- the mechanisms by which genes produce traits affecting fitness-
tbat indicate what we should take to be the units of selection. The claim 
I am making in the sickle cell case is that the traits relevant to explaining 
the differential fitnesses of organisms are produced by diploid types rather 
than single alleles. The causal story of the production of these traits makes 
reference to both of the homologous alleles. 
One objection to this analysis is as follows: If it is supposed that we 
12. For simplicity 1 shull assume that the on ly two hemoglobins arc A and S. There arc 
olhcr type~ that may be present, but they are not relevant to Lhe discussion here. See 
Wagner and Mitchell 1965. 615 622. 
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must include in the genotype all those genes that are implicated in the 
causal processes giving rise to a trait, one must include much more than 
the genes at a single locus. The production of hemoglobin of any variety 
relies upon a complex developmental mechanism involving many genes. 
a nd in the absence o f these genes, none of the character variants will man-
ifest themselves. 
This objection is really an instance of a much more general concern 
about causal claims. Commonly we assert that some single event or state 
of a ffairs was " the" cause of some other event, when in reality it was only 
the supposed cause in conjunction with a variety of other events or states 
of affairs that would be sufficient to bring about the effect. For instance, 
we might say that a fire was caused by a short circuit. but evidently the 
short circuit would no t have been sufficient to bring about the fire in the 
absence of o ther factors, such as a nearby collection of fla mmable mate-
rial, oxygen, etc. J . L. Mackie (1980) has provided an a na lysis of this kind 
of usage that explains and justifies isolating a single facto r as the cause. 
According to Mackie, singular causal claims are made against the back-
ground of a causal field , which is a set o f conditions that are presumed to 
hold. When one claims that A was the cause of B relative to a causal field , 
one is claiming that, relative to the causal field. it was A that made the 
difference between B's occurring and its no t occurring. Applying this a nal-
ysis to the case at hand, the wide variety of genes whose presence plays 
some role in the development of red blood cells will be part of the causal 
field. It should be admitted that to a certa in degree the question of what 
falls within the causal field is a pragmatic issue, and to admit as much is 
to raise certain doubts abo ut the claim that there is a unique unit of se-
lection. However, there are objective features of the particular scenario 
which la rgely determine the choice of the causal field. Most no tably, any 
genes tha t a re required for the development of red blood cells generally 
will be shared by all via ble human beings. Thus, when we ask, what caused 
this person to have the sick le cell trait , we say that it is the presence of the 
two recessive sickle cell a lleles, since it is this pair of genes that is sufficient 
relative to the causal field to produce sickling red blood cells. 
A second objection to the proposed a nalysis of the sickle cell is thar, 
contra ry to what I have said, single a lleles do produce traits tha t differ-
entially affect fitness. Having the sickle cell allele is necessary to produce 
S hemoglobin, while having the wild-type allele is necessary to prod uce A 
hemoglobin. On what basis does one claim that there are three different 
traits, rather tha n two? 
The problem here, of course. is that how one counts traits depends upon 
the level of o rganization at which those traits are described. Within the 
cell , bo th A and S hemoglobin are produced , so there is codominance, 
while. at the cellular level. the sickle trait red blood cell is an intermediate, 
134 STUART GLENNAN 
so there is incomplete dominance. But why prefer the cellular level for a 
description of the phenotype? The reason, I suggest, is because the cell is 
the lowest level at which the phenotypic traits have a reliable efTect on the 
fitness of an organism. 
As I suggested at the beginning of the paper, the genie selectionist will 
here argue that I have begged the question, by simply assuming an eco-
logical as opposed to a genetic environment concept. Waters in particular 
has argued that one can provide an equally adeq uate descripcion of the 
same causal process at the genetic level, simply by arguing that that net 
changes in gene frequencies for the sickle cell allele are the sum of two 
selection processes, one in genetic environments containing A as the ho-
mologous allele and another in environments containing a (Waters 1991, 
562). Waters takes this case as exemplifying a more general principle, that 
there is generally more than one way to correctly describe a given causal 
process. About this general claim, I cannot disagree. Indeed, the problem 
of deciding how to draw the boundary between selective domain and en-
vironment is an instance of the general problem of how to draw the bound-
ary between a mechanism and its environment- a problem which r have 
suggested elsewhere (1992) has pragmatic dimensions. 
But while l grant the general claim, J must take issue with the claim 
tha t we can't judge the organismic description of the sickle cell case su-
perior to the genie description. Viewed as a singular explanation of the 
viability of a single allele, there is not much to choose between the ac-
counts. The problem is that when one applies the gene's eye view to the 
description of a process involving the evolution of a population of organ-
isms. the gene's eye view obscures important explanatory information. If 
each gene is within its own environment, the gene's eye view produces a 
massive proliferation of environments. 
Sober and Wilson ( 1994, 1999) have argued that the key to understand-
ing the levels of selection problem is the concept of common fate. A group 
of entities (of genes or organisms) fall within a single selective domain 
when they live or die togecher in virtue of some common property. In this 
case, human beings live or die as wholes, and consequently it is appro-
priate to model them as interactors facing a single environment. Once this 
fact is granted, one can ask what genes are implicated in the causal mech-
anisms that produce traits that afTect the interactors' common fate.13 
I have up until now articulated a mechanistic approach to the units of 
13. Sober and Wilson directly repudiate Wimsatt's additivity criterion ( 1994, 543) and 
by extension the principle enunciated in Sober and Lewontin. Sober seems to realize 
that he must give up on this as an analysis of the units of selection, but he does not 
appear to recognize that it is symptomatic of more general problems with his approach 
to causation. 
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selection problem i.n the context of the pa rticular case of the sickle cell 
allele. I would now like to generalize this to give a general definition of a 
unit of selection. To repeat, I am here considering only the units of selec-
Lion question. I take it as given that the level of selection is the organism, 
and the unit of selection is some part of the o rganism's genome. The def-
inition could be generalized to consider units responsible for the produc-
tion of traits in interactors a t other levels. In wha t follows, I use the term 
genotype to refer to some collection of loci, ranging from the location of 
a single allele to the collection of all loci in the genome. Each possible 
combination o f alleles that can occupy the loci in the genotype I sha ll call 
a varianr of the genotype. We have then the following definition: 
A genotype G is a unit of selection in environment E if, and only if, 
instances of the different variants o f G reliably produce phenotypic 
characters that have differentia l capacities to inRuence an individual 
o rganism's fitness in£, and these characters a re not reliably produced 
by variants of any smaller segment o f the genome. 
T his definition clearly construes the unit of selection as a causal concept. 
The mechanistic element appears in the requirement tha t instances of var-
iants of G reliably produce certain phenotypic characters. Reliable pro-
duction of these characters is, as I have argued, the result of the opera tion 
of developmental mechanisms. On the singularist and mechanistic ap-
proach I recommend, the concept of unanimous effect of a type is replaced 
with the concept of reliable operation of a singular mechanism. N umero us 
instances of reliable mechanisms of a certain kind may give rise to unan-
imous or (more likely) near-unanimous effects. However, type ca usal re-
lations a re entirely derivative from token causal relations. 14 
6. Conclusion. Sober and Lewontin claim that genie fitnesses are in genera l 
artifacts, while genotype fitnesses are not. In fact both a re artifacts in some 
sense. Fitnesses in genera l are properties of types, but evolution ultimately 
occurs as a result of the differentia l reproductive success of individual 
organisms. The success (or lack thereof) of individuals in turn is caused 
by the various tra its they possess. This fact is not meant to suggest tha t it 
is inappropriate to talk of evolution of genotypes. Evolutionary expla-
nations are meant to explain changes in the frequency of genotypes and 
phenotypes. However, we must gel the explana tory order con-ect. We ex-
14. While l shall no t argue for the claim in detail here. it seems to me tha t my deftn ition 
is really not far from the additivity deftnitions proposed by Wimsall (1980) and Lloyd 
( 1994). The largest difference is that, while the additivi ty defi nitions a re based upon 
varia tions in fitness, mine is based upon the mecha nisms giving rise to traits tha t pro-
duce variations of fitness. 
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plain the fitness of a genotype by reference to the reproductive success of 
individuals having that type, rather than explaining the reproductive suc-
cess of the individual by reference to its instantiating a genotype. One 
genotype is fitter than another because on average the individuals that are 
instances of that type are more reproductively successful than another. 
Although this paper has focused on the nature of causal claims about 
selection processes, the argument offered here (see also Glen nan 1997) has 
general applicability to any domains (including most or all of the life and 
social sciences) in which causal generalizations a re made about popula-
tions. If, as 1 have argued, causal claims are ultimately singular claims 
about mechanisms and mechanistic processes, we must reconceive the 
causal generalizations in those domains as causal upshots in particular 
populations. And to achieve better understanding why these generaliza-
tions are true, we must understa nd the mechanisms at work in the indi-
viduals that comprise these populations. 
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